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Coping with Sales Call Anxiety:  










We study how salespeople cope with sales call anxiety and find that 
two tactics ultimately reduce dysfunctional protective actions in 
selling interactions.  That is, situation modification and attentional 
deployment both moderate the effects of felt physiological sensations 
and anxiety on protective actions.
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Sales call anxiety (SCA) is an intrusive, pervasive emotion in personal selling situations and 
consists of three components: negative expectations and thoughts (i.e., anxiety cognitions), 
physiological sensations, and protective (as opposed to assertive or inquisitive) actions. Verbeke 
and Bagozzi (2000; 2003) showed that the components of SCA have strong negative impacts on 
such performance outcomes as quality of communication and sales volume. Psychologically, 
protective actions are potentially the most damaging aspect of SCA (Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000, p. 
97), because they negatively affect the perceived competence of a salesperson and lead to self-
reinforcing cyclic behaviors that perpetuate SCA (Wells et al. 1995)1. 
Although Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) showed that excessive SCA is dysfunctional for 
salespeople and the organization, they did not study how salespeople cope with SCA so as to 
provide guidelines for self-regulation and for managerial interventions. Verbeke and Bagozzi 
(2000) did propose a number of plausible coping tactics in the Discussion of their article. But we 
argue in the next section that the tactics they proposed have two drawbacks and that a new 
conceptualization is needed for how coping with SCA occurs. 
The goal of this paper is to study how salespeople effectively cope with SCA, specifically 
with regard urges to withdraw or disengage with customers during closing (Verbeke and Bagozzi 
2000; Wells et al. 1995). We focus on two frequently used coping techniques, namely situation 
modification and attentional deployment (Gross 1999), which form the core elements of anxiety 
therapies in the contemporary psychology literature (e.g., Rachman 1998; Clark and Wells 1995; 
Leary and Kowalski 1995). We investigate how these two coping strategies either help or hinder 
salespeople in coping with their SCA. Because virtually no research can be found in the marketing 
or organizational behavior literatures on this topic, we draw upon and adapt basic research from 
psychology to this practical marketing problem.   
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we explain why it is difficult for salespeople and sales 
managers alike to make adequate decisions about what coping tactic to choose for overcoming 
SCA. Second, we present a revised version of Verbeke and Bagozzi’s (2000) SCA model by 
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proposing that protective actions are influenced by anxiety cognitions and physiological sensations. 
Third, we discuss attentional deployment and situation modification as coping tactics and develop 
hypotheses on how these tactics impact protective actions associated with SCA. We show that each 
coping tactic interacts with either anxiety cognitions or felt physiological sensations to affect 
protective action implementation. Finally, implications for practitioners and researchers are 
presented. 
Fundamental Impediments to Any Coping Efforts 
 In concert with recent calls for sales managers to take more active roles in helping 
salespeople cope with difficulties on the job (e.g., Bolman Pullins and Fine 2002; Marshall and 
Michales 2001), Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) proposed a variety of tactics for reducing SCA. Their 
suggestions addressed the components of SCA as main effects and did not consider their 
interactions with coping responses. Consideration of interactions is essential, it can be argued, 
because research in psychology has produced opposite policy recommendations. For example, Foa 
and Kozak (1986) conceive of thought distraction as a specific kind of attentional deployment 
tactic, which amplifies feelings of anxiety and their relationship with protective actions. By 
contrast, Wells (1997) conceives of thought distraction as a helpful coping tactic that reduces 
feelings of anxiety and their relationship with protective actions. Without a theory of how thought 
distraction functions with SCA, any recommendation on self-regulation or managerial intervention 
could be indeterminant or even determental if implemented in the field. 
Recent research by Gross (1998) provides a starting point for better thinking about how 
coping with SCA occurs and what this means for managing it. In his experiments, Gross (1998) 
found that coping had opposite effects. That is, coping lowered the expression of negative emotions 
but at the same time amplified the physiological manifestations of it.  Likewise, our review of the 
literature in psychology reveals that coping techniques result in opposite effects when the intensity 
of certain components of the emotional system (e.g., anxiety cognitions, felt physiological 
reactions) changes significantly; i.e., interaction effects have been found between anxiety 
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components and coping (e.g., McCaul and Malott 1984; McCaul and Haugtvedt 1982). Extending 
these ideas and findings to the SCA context, we feel that it is important to consider whether certain 
applications of coping tactics might back fire when particular components of the emotional system 
intensify. It is essential to identify the specific interactions, if salespeople and sales managers are to 
effectively manage SCA. 
A Revised Process Model of Sales Call Anxiety 
SCA is a pervasive anticipatory emotion that occurs when sales people foresee that an 
upcoming selling situation may be potentially damaging to their self-image and performance. 
Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) conceive of SCA responses as “anxiety programs”, which can best be 
defined as self-reinforcing systems of cognitive, somatic, affective, and behavioral changes that are 
designed to protect a person from harm in objectively dangerous environments. But once triggered, 
these anxiety programs amplify the perceived danger during a selling situation, making the 
salesperson less assertive and less effective as a communicator. 
Bagozzi and Verbeke (2000) treated anxiety cognitions, felt physiological sensations, and 
protective actions as three components of one overall SCA construct. But based on findings in 
clinical and social psychology showing that the cognitive and physiological components need not 
function in tandem, and our intuition that cognitive and physiological sensations can be best 
categorized as psychological reactions, and protective actions are best thought of as behavioral 
responses, we propose Figure 1 as a working diagram of SCA and its relationship to selling 
situations, which we will elaborate upon shortly. The two psychological SCA reactions interact 
with the two proposed coping mechanisms to influence the behavioral manifestation of SCA. In 
sum, Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) studied the effect of an agglomerization of the three components 
of SCA on performance. We investigate how salespeople cope with the two psychological 
components of SCA and how this coping moderates the effects of the two components on 
protective actions. Thus, we revise Verbeke and Bagozzi’s (2000) conceptualization of SCA and 
then show how salespeople cope with SCA and react accordingly. 
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SCA is not a unitary phenomenon but a syndrome of interdependent cognitive and 
physiological components that result in protective actions (Kendall 1982). Although linked to each 
other, these components need not always be evenly triggered when salespeople experience anxiety-
provoking situations (Lang, Levin, Miller, and Kozak 1983). As Rachman (1998, p. 8) notes, 
“some people experience subjective fear but remain outwardly calm and show none of the expected 
physiological correlates of fear, such as trembling, palpitations, or perspiring.”2  
(Place Figure 1 about here) 
More specifically, SCA can be characterized as follows:  
1) SCA comprises negative expectations about the course and outcomes of an upcoming 
transaction that become exaggerated when small failures or setbacks occur. The exaggeration 
takes the form of negative thoughts or foreboding about possible larger failures. Similarly, as 
with other types of anxiety, these negative cognitions come accompanied with heightened 
physiological responses, especially in the sympathetic nervous system, such as manifest in 
increased heart rate, feeling jittery, or speaking too fast. The salesperson’s cognitive and 
adaptive resources are consumed both by such self-focused awareness of anxiety (e.g., 
Hamilton 1975) and the physiological sensations that come with them (McCaul and Malott 
1984), thus threatening one’s ability to successfully handle the sales interaction effectively. For 
instance, SCA draws attention away from the customer and the on-going transaction, and the 
salesperson becomes fixated on the self (Clark and Wells 1995). 
2) The amplification of potential danger, coupled with inward focused attention and the person’s 
desire to convey a favorable impression, lead to a “protective” (as opposed to an assertive or 
inquisitive) self-presentational style (e.g., Shepperd and Arkin 1990). Socially anxious people 
tend to adopt a conservative, protective interpersonal style in their attempt to avoid social 
disapproval and negative social reactions. As Salkovskis (1991) and Wells et al. (1995) point 
out, such protective actions are problematic for different reasons. First, they prevent anxious 
persons from disconfirming unrealistic beliefs about their feared behaviors or the consequences 
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of their behaviors (e.g., being negatively evaluated and rejected). Second, to some extent they 
also provoke the feared consequences: for instance, such protective actions as the assumption of 
a passive posture, a reluctance to engage the customer or ask for a commitment, or hyper-
apologizing are likely to be perceived as behavioral deficits by customers and hence produce a 
negative interaction pattern that further contributes to excessive SCA (Clark and Wells 1995). 
Finally, as Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000, p. 97) argue, “protective actions are potentially the 
most damaging [part of SCA] … At the point of salespeople-customer interactions, such 
protective actions … can break down trust and lead customers to question the competence of 
the salesperson”. 
Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000; 2003) demonstrated that the components of SCA are closely 
linked to a salesperson’s communication performance and sales volume performance. The question 
that emerges is what steps do salespeople take to successfully cope with SCA. A similar point has 
been made by the psychologist Rosenbaum (1983, p. 55): “maybe we should think not in terms of 
why phobias and rituals are acquired in the first place, but rather why once these are acquired, 
patients have failed to extinguish them”. Similarly, Rosenbaum (1988, p. 492) stresses that it is not 
so much the negative reactions of individuals but rather their positive efforts to cope with these 
reactions that are key (see also Seligman 2002). 
Two Perspectives on SCA 
In the psychology literature, two perspectives on emotions in general can be seen (Ohman, 
Hamm, and Hugdahl 1998). One focuses on the cognitive aspects of emotions, and proposes that 
emotions are a result of expectancy-based learning. The second concentrates on automatic 
processes in the development of emotions and sees emotions as sympathetic nervous system 
responses. For the specific emotion of anxiety, researchers similarly emphasize either a cognitive 
(e.g., Wells and Matthews 1994; Wells 1997) or a physiological perspective (e.g., LeDoux 1995; 
Foa and Kozak 1986), each emphasizing different components of SCA; namely, anxiety cognitions 
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or anxiety physiology. Although these perspectives share some features, they lead to different 
predictions as developed below (e.g., Rachman, 1998, p. 68). 
Cognitive perspectives on anxiety especially focus on thinking processes associated with 
anxiety, the loss of attentional resources that comes with it, and its effects on protective actions 
(e.g., Wells and Mathews 1994). Beck (1988), for instance, conceives of anxiety as the result of 
cognitive (mis)interpretations of internal cues such as autonomic nervous system symptoms: “Panic 
prone patients tend to fix their attention on any bodily or mental experiences that are not explicable 
as normal” (Beck 1988, p. 91). Referring particularly to social anxiety, Clark and Wells (1995) note 
that an anxious person early-on perceives signs of autonomic arousal, and these sensations interfere 
with the person’s ability to process the ordinary information that arises in social interactions, with 
the further result of producing negative self-evaluative thoughts (i.e., anxiety cognitions). The 
sensations are then taken as confirmatory evidence for one’s inadequacy, oddness, or social 
unacceptability. The individual worries about how others will perceive the bodily sensations they 
feel themselves (Rachman 1998; Leary and Kowalski 1995), and indeed, as noted above, socially 
anxious people have been found to overestimate the extent to which their anxiety is observable 
(e.g., McEwan and Devins 1983). As Cioffi (1991) sums it up, rumination focuses one’s attention 
toward the inside (i.e., on one’s own thoughts and feelings). Yet, people only have a limited 
amount of attentional capacity (e.g., Kahnemann 1973; Navon and Gopher 1979), and therefore 
excessive self-focused attention draws away from scrutiny of external matters, particularly the 
objective task at hand. In sum, researchers focusing on cognitive perspectives argue that anxious 
people deplete their attentional and cognitive resources in creating negative thoughts and overly 
focusing upon them (Hamilton 1975). Typically, psychologists argue that anxiety reactions persist 
as a result of maladaptive cognitions, and propose that the most effective way to reduce or remove 
anxiety itself is to modify, suppress, or remove the thoughts responsible for magnifying the anxiety 
(e.g., Clark 1988; Clark and Wells 1995).  
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On the other hand, the second stream of research focuses on the physiological dimensions 
of anxiety. Klein (1993), for example, argues that biological and physiological symptoms (e.g., 
shortness of breath) are primarily responsible for triggering anxiety. LeDoux (1995) identified the 
brain circuitry that underlies fear conditioning and found that fear information passes first to the 
sensory thalamus and then proceeds on to either a thalamo-to-cortico-to-amygdala pathway or an 
immediate thalamo-to-amygdala pathway. In particular, the latter, direct pathway is of interest, as it 
implies that fear conditioning takes place without participation of the cortex (i.e., without conscious 
information processing): “subcortical sensory inputs to the amygdala may represent an evolutionary 
primitive system passed on from early vertebrates that lacked well-developed neocortices. … 
However, these pathways continue to function as an early warning system, allowing the amygdala 
to be activated by simple stimulus features that may serve as emotional triggers” (LeDoux 1993, p. 
112). Similar to obtrusive negative cognitions, intense physiological sensations consume attentional 
resources (McCaul and Malott 1984). In the case of physiological sensations, however, these 
resources can not be set free by voluntarily redirecting one’s attention (Cioffi 1991): “as [a 
physiological sensation] reaches some intense level, it will begin to attract attention and impede the 
effectiveness of distraction” (McCaul and Malott 1984, p. 518). Coping attempts, therefore, have to 
focus on the underlying physiology, rather than directly addressing attention processes. An 
effective means for changing the physiological component of anxiety is exposure therapy (e.g., 
Rachman 1998; Leary and Kowalski 1995).3 The mechanism in exposure therapy is the 
physiological habituation to an anxiety inducing situation (Watts 1979). During confrontation with 
feared situations, the physiological anxiety responses decrease because of habituation, thus 
generating information about the absence of physiological arousal that inhibits the anxiety program. 
In sum, both cognitive reactions and physiological sensations that come with anxiety 
consume and distort the person’s resources; yet, different coping strategies are required for 
successfully regulating SCA and freeing the resources, depending on the intensity of the anxiety 
components (anxiety cognitions versus felt physiological reactions). Rachman (1998, p. 11) notes 
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in this regard that components of fear “are loosely coupled and any of them can predominate as 
circumstances change.” To choose an adequate coping strategy in order to manage SCA, 
salespeople and sales managers have to become aware of or sense the intensities of their anxiety 
cognitions or physiological sensations.  
Coping with SCA 
“Emotion regulation refers to the processes by which we influence which emotions we have, 
when we have them, and how we experience and express them” (Gross 2002, p. 282). Coping is an 
effortful endeavor to self-regulate the otherwise intrusive feelings that are typical for anxiety and 
that might prevent a salesperson from reaching his/her goals. It is also true that coping efforts are 
learned over time and so become elicited automatically by cues in the proper situation. Based on 
research on emotion regulation by various psychologists taking either a cognitive or physiological 
perspective (e.g., Cioffi 1991; Wells 2000; Foa and Kozak 1986; Goldberger and Breznitz 1993), 
we focus on the anxiety-reducing impact of situation modification and attentional deployment, as 
different coping strategies used by salespeople, the first being a behavioral strategy, the latter being 
a cognitive strategy.4 These two coping strategies form core elements in contemporary anxiety 
therapy (e.g., Rachman 1998; Wells 1994; 2000; Goldberger and Breznitz 1993) and are more 
specifically defined as follows:  
a) Attentional deployment: Situations are typically complex, consisting of a multiplicity of 
characteristics. By focusing on particular aspects, while ignoring others, people regulate the 
elicitation of their emotions. This occurs, for instance, by concentrating intensely on a particular 
topic or task (Csikszentmihalyi 1975) or by distracting oneself (e.g., Nix, Watson, Pyszczynski, 
and Greenberg 1995). A promising distraction strategy in sales settings is to direct or 
concentrate one’s attention on the task at hand; such coping behavior has proved to be 
successful for such cognitive forms of anxiety as test anxiety (see Wine 1980).5 Attentional 
deployment strategies are particularly promoted by psychologists following the cognitive 
perspective on anxiety and are an essential part in cognitive anxiety therapy programs (e.g., 
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Wells 2000). However, they have not been studied in the personal selling context. We 
investigate attentional deployment as one of two key coping tactics. 
b) Situation modification: Situation modification strategies often take the form of engaging 
deliberate problem-focused efforts to change the environment (Folkman et al. 1986). For 
example, “planful problem-solving” with SCA might include actively approaching the customer 
and asking him/her to reveal potential problems in the sales interaction and to disclose any 
concerns, resentments, or hard feelings resulting therefrom. Such confrontation with potentially 
fear-laden situations has been shown to be an efficient means for reducing anxiety in everyday 
contexts, as it works as a form of exposure therapy (e.g., Rachman 1998; Zinbarg et al. 1992). 
In this regard, active problem-solving approaches might lead to physiological habituation and 
enhancement of the person’s sense of control (Butler 1985). Situation modification strategies 
are therefore the favored emotion regulation strategy of supporters of a physiological 
perspective on anxiety but have not been studied in the personal selling context. Situation 
modification is the second key coping tactic we investigate. 
The Cognitive Perspective: Attentional Deployment as a Coping Tactic 
Because of their tendency a) to self-generate or exaggerate the symptoms of social anxiety 
and b) to prevent disconfirmation of anxiety beliefs, salespeople who experience SCA are expected 
to employ the systematic manipulation of protective actions as one of the most important 
components in the treatment of SCA (Wells et al. 1995; Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000).  
Direct (main) effects 
Psychologists argue that avoidance behaviors are learned by similar processes as anxiety: 
“avoidance conditioning is believed to involve Pavlovian fear conditioning followed by the 
learning of the instrumental avoidance response” (LeDoux 1995, p. 221). Over time, avoidance 
behaviors thus become automatic and mostly unconscious behavioral sequences, where behaviors 
are controlled by their antecedents rather than by their consequences (Bouton and Bolles 1980). 
Countering these processes requires active (behavioral) learning approaches in the form of explicit 
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extinction training (Bouton and Swartzentruber 1991). Since attentional deployment does not focus 
on behavior but solely on cognitive processes, it should have no direct effect in terms of reducing 
protective actions. Hence, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 1: Attentional deployment will not influence protective actions of salespeople 
experiencing SCA.  
Interaction effects 
Yet, as attentional deployment strategies have been found to have contradictory results in 
coping with anxiety (e.g., Foa and Kozak 1986; Wells 2000), we might expect interaction effects 
between the components of SCA (i.e., anxiety cognitions and physiological sensations) and 
distraction tactics regarding protective actions. Two kinds of interactions are described below.  
Interaction effects with anxiety cognitions. Focusing on external stimuli (i.e., concentrating 
on the selling task) should be particularly useful for coping with SCA, which is characterized by 
high degrees of anxiety cognitions. Socially anxious salespeople who are preoccupied with 
thoughts about their social and personal deficiencies (which occur as anxiety cognitions) are more 
likely to encode and (mis)interpret another’s behavior as indicating rejection. That is, the person’s 
fears produce a negativity bias of the person’s perceptions (Leary and Kowalski 1995), thus making 
disconfirming experiences more difficult and the activation of protective actions more likely (Clark 
and Arkowitz 1975). Focusing one’s attention on the task, on the other hand, channels the person’s 
attention to information that disconfirms his/her negative beliefs, thus reducing the threat potential 
of the situation and, in turn, the person’s urge to escape by turning to protective actions. Thus, we 
propose: 
Hypothesis 2: When anxiety cognitions are high (low), attentional deployment will (will 
not) reduce protective actions for salespeople experiencing SCA.  
Interaction effects with physiological sensations. The psychological literature provides two 
rationales that speak against the use of attentional deployment strategies in combination with strong 
physiological symptoms. First, distraction techniques only work for relatively low levels of 
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physiological sensations (e.g., McCaul and Malott 1984). Attentional deployment works less well 
as a regulator of protective actions when perceived physiological symptoms are intense: “Given 
only limited willful power over attention, some pain is simply too severe or chronic to ignore” 
(Cioffi 1991, p. 28).6 Failure to successfully apply distraction techniques might even result in 
feelings of loss of control. In addition, experiences of high physiological symptoms, themselves, 
signal to the individual that he/she suffers from a loss of control, thus further intensifying the 
person’s feelings of loss of control and possibly leading to generalized learned helplessness 
(Seligman 1975). Such feelings enhance a person’s urge to show protective actions. Second, 
exposure therapists argue against use of attentional deployment techniques, as it runs counter to the 
effects of exposure therapy (e.g., Foa and Kozak 1986). Successful exposure therapy involves 
anxiety-disconfirming physiological experience. Therefore, the person has to focus his/her attention 
on the physiological sensations to notice that the symptoms decline. Distraction by focusing one’s 
attention on external cues draws attention away from the emotional experience, thus making it 
more difficult for persons to realize a disconfirmation of their learned anxiety patterns that leads to 
extinction (e.g., Sartory, Rachman, and Gray 1982; Grayson, Foa, and Steketee 1982). As Foa and 
Kozak (1986, p. 25) sum it up, “avoidance of fear-relevant information prevents amelioration of 
anxiety.” We therefore suggest: 
Hypothesis 3: When physiological sensations are intense (weak), attentional deployment 
will not (will) reduce protective actions of salespeople experiencing SCA.  
The Physiological Perspective: Situation Modification as a Coping Strategy 
Direct effects. First, it should be pointed out that situation modification in response to 
feared situations has been found to be an adequate strategy for anxiety disorders in general (e.g., 
Foa and Kozak 1986; LeDoux 1995). As a consequence of prolonged and repeated exposure to and 
confrontation with a feared situation, emotional processing of fear information and habituation to 
the situation take place. When physiological responses decrease during the confrontation, 
information about the absence of physiological arousal is generated (Foa and Kozak 1986). Planful 
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problem-solving approaches of a salesperson, who encounters difficulties during his/her sales 
interactions, focus specifically on the anxiety eliciting situation, and therefore should trigger SCA 
and lead to similar processes as in exposure therapy.  
Second, based on control theory (e.g., Brehm 1966; Seligman 1975), psychologists argue 
that the experience of uncontrollable aversive stimuli induces feelings of incompetence, anger, or 
anxiety. On the other hand, the perception of being able to control a feared situation gives the 
person the safe feeling that he or she can change the situation before things get out of hand (Miller 
1979). Situation modification as a coping strategy is closely linked to perceived control: 
successfully modifying a situation increases the feelings of control and the self-efficacy of the 
person (e.g., Bandura 1997). According to this model, exposure is effective in reducing protective 
actions to the extent that it increases the person’s judgment of his/her abilities to perform fear-
related behaviors (Bandura 1977). In this regard, Butler (1985, p. 656) comments on the use of 
situation modification approaches as a treatment of social anxiety: “Practice probably also increases 
the range of social experience, knowledge about social events and the number of social skills 
available. All these factors are likely to increase the patient’s sense of control over difficult 
situations and self-confidence, and these in turn motivate patients to practice (or not to avoid) 
entering difficult situations.” As a consequence, salespeople who regularly use situation 
modification strategies to cope with their SCA should effectively reduce their protective actions in 
the long run. Thus we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 4: Situation modification will reduce protective actions by salespersons 
experiencing SCA.  
Research concerning the use of exposure as a means of reducing anxiety and related 
protective actions has yielded mixed results. Although an appropriate treatment for reducing 
protective actions for some forms of anxiety, exposure has proved to be less efficient as a treatment 
for other forms of anxiety (e.g., Rachman 1998; Motley 1991). Reasons for these seemingly 
contradictory findings might be found in the focus on different components of anxiety (i.e., 
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cognitions versus physiological aspects). Therefore, we expect interaction effects between the 
components of SCA and situation modification as a coping strategy. Two interactions of particular 
interest follow.  
Interaction effects with anxiety cognitions. Successful problem-solving demands resources 
from salespeople. Matthews and Wells (2000, p. 79) argue that in the case of strong anxiety 
cognitions “attention is withdrawn from external stimuli and diverted toward internal thoughts. … 
Worry may sometimes be adaptive, to the extent that it prepares the person to cope with a 
subsequent event, or it can facilitate reflective problem solving. However, it has the general effect 
of reducing the availability of attentional resources for other activities so that the worrier is 
cognitively impaired, as shown in many experimental studies (Eysenck 1992; Sarason, Sarason, 
and Pierce 1995). In particular, worry is likely to interfere with task-focused coping in demanding 
situations.”7 Similarly, Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice (1994, p. 112) note the following on the 
effect of negative beliefs: “When people engage in ruminative, emotion-focused thoughts and 
behaviors, they are less likely to engage in active problem-solving thoughts and behaviors (Carver, 
Scheier, and Weintraub 1989; Klinger 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema 1993). In other words, one reason 
brooding about one’s emotional state or problems is an ineffective mood control strategy is because 
it seems to interfere with active problem-solving.” 
Second, described as catastrophic beliefs and worries about consequences (e.g., Leary and 
Kowalski 1995; Heimberg et al. 1995), anxiety cognitions are by definition negatively related to 
perceived control; that is, high anxiety cognitions lead to low self-assurance and low perceived 
self-efficacy (Bandura 1997). If the individual nevertheless tries to engage in situation modification 
while suffering from strong anxiety cognitions, his/her low self-efficacy might influence the 
behavior negatively, thus making successful situation modification unlikely (Carver, Scheier, and 
Weintraub 1989). Such a failure, in turn, should enhance the existing feeling of loss of control, thus 
producing the urge to escape the feared situations by turning to protective actions. Hence, we 
propose: 
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Hypothesis 5: When anxiety cognitions are high (low), situation modification will be less 
(more) effective for reducing protective actions by salespeople experiencing 
SCA.  
Interaction effects with physiological sensations. The psychology literature indicates that 
exposure therapy might be particularly beneficial for persons with anxiety disorders characterized 
by high degrees of felt physiological symptoms. This occurs because the underlying mechanism is 
physiological habituation as a result of repeated elicitation of, and exposure to, anxiety (Rachman 
1998). Successful habituation, however, requires prior evocation of physiological anxiety reactions, 
as Foa and Kozak (1986, p. 22) point out: “Because we construe a fear structure as a program to 
escape or avoid, it follows that activation of fear cannot occur without preparatory physiological 
activity.” From this perspective, situational modification should be more efficient in anxiety 
reactions with a higher versus lower physiological component. In addition, the ability to down-
regulate one’s physiological sensations (through repeated exposure) enhances the person’s sense of 
control and self-efficacy. Thus, situational modification might act as a resource for salespeople, 
which allows them to counter their urges to use protective actions as a means of coping with their 
SCA. As a consequence, the stronger the physiological sensations the salesperson is able to control, 
the stronger should be his/her experience of positive control. We therefore propose:  
Hypothesis 6: When physiological sensations are intense (mild), situation modification will 
(will not) reduce protective actions more effectively for salespersons 
experiencing SCA.   
Method 
Respondents and Procedure 
Questionnaires were given to 180 salespeople who worked in a direct selling environment. 
These people sold computer courses. Ninety-nine salespeople returned the questionnaires, for a 55 
% response rate. In exchange for their participation, respondents received a gift of $12. The sample 
may be described as follows: a majority (78 %) of the salespeople were men, 27 % of the 
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salespeople were younger than 30 years old, 46% were between 30 and 40, 18% between 40 and 
50, and 9% was older than 50. With respect to experience, 35% of the sample had been with the 
organization less than 2 years, 35% had been with the firm between 2 and 6 years inclusive, and 
30% were with the company for between 6 and 20 years. Finally, most salespeople had finished 
basic and advanced vocational studies. Only 1% had a university or college degree. The items in 
the questionnaire were presented in an analogous way to the procedure used by Verbeke and 
Bagozzi (2000). As suggested by Bickart (1993), the questionnaires were printed in different 
versions such that different sections were counterbalanced to avoid carryover effects.  The SCA 
items were introduced with an instruction that asked the respondent to put him/herself in the 
position of closing a sales interaction: 
“You are engaged in a sales conversation with a customer. After some time, you 
want to make the sale final. During this phase, you need to communicate some 
details about the offer before the contract can be signed. You realize that obtaining 
the offer during this conversation is important for you. What is going on in your 
mind?” 
These instructions were then followed by items designed to measure the dimensions of SCA in 
closing situations as suggested by Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000). That is, negative self-evaluations, 
negative evaluations from customers, physiological symptoms, and protective actions were 
measured. Scenarios were used to study SCA because it is unethical to directly manipulate the 
emotions of participants, particularly negative emotions like SCA. Our approach follows rather 
common practice in psychology whereby emotions are indirectly induced by asking respondents to 
put themselves in the place of protagonists in a vignette (e.g., Roseman 1991; Smith and Lazarus 
1993). Additionally, research shows that real and imagined reactions to emotional stimuli (by direct 
manipulation and by scenarios) converge to a high degree (Robinson and Clore 2001). 
Following the SCA section, salespeople were next asked for their strategies of coping with 
SCA that they normally used. The items were introduced with the words:  “In sales conversations, 
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you might experience a certain amount of tension and uneasy feelings. The following questions 
refer to ways that you might cope with these feelings. Please indicate the extent to which you use 
the following strategies.” The coping strategy items then followed.  
Measures 
For testing the structure of the scales, we performed maximum likelihood factor analysis 
with oblimin rotation by use of SPSS on the items of each scale. The different dimensions of the 
scale were analyzed, and items not loading .50 or greater on focal factors and loadings .25 or more 
on non-focal factors were deleted. Criteria for accepting factors relied on inspection of the scree 
plot (Briggs and Cheek 1986; DeVellis 1991). The reliabilities for items of each scale were also 
assessed by means of Cronbach alpha. The factor loadings and reliabilities are summarized in Table 
1, where it can be seen that all measures achieved satisfactory reliabilities exceeding the minimum 
of .70 recommended by Nunnally (1978). The items used in the questionnaire can be found in 
Appendix 1. 
(Place Table 1 about here) 
Sales Call Anxiety. For measuring SCA, we used the same items as Verbeke and Bagozzi 
(2000). Psychological research shows that social anxiety is situation-specific (e.g., Leary and 
Kowalski 1995; Rachman 1998). In their studies of SCA, Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) identified 
canvassing and closing as the most anxiety-provoking contexts in sales situations. Because only a 
few of the salespeople in our sample were responsible for recruiting new customers (canvassing), 
but all salespeople had to close sales, we focused only on closing situations as cues in the 
questionnaire items. 
1) Anxiety cognitions. We used the two closing sets of items from Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) 
for capturing anxiety cognitions (see Appendix 1). First, dysfunctional beliefs about the self 
were measured by 6 items (e.g., “I hope that I will not start to stutter.”); second, beliefs about 
social evaluation were measured by 8 items (e.g., “The customer thinks that I am not able to sell 
something.”). The results of the factor analysis suggest that the items load on a single factor 
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explaining 58 percent of the total variance (KMO = .81; eigenvalue = 4.84, with 40 percent 
variance explained). Two items on social evaluations were excluded from further analysis 
because they loaded on a separate factor. The reliability of the anxiety cognition scale was .86, 
and the factor loadings for the one factor solution reveal high loadings in all cases (see Table 1).   
2) Physiological sensations. Here we also used the items from Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000). First, 
we measured experiences concerning verbal communication behavior by 8 items (e.g., “I speak 
too much.”); second, we measured experiences referring to non-verbal behaviors by 6 items 
(e.g., “My hands begin to tremble.”). All responses were obtained on a seven-point Likert-scale. 
Factor analysis supports a one-factor solution (KMO = .82; eigenvalue = 5.15, with 47 percent 
of the variance explained). Three items were deleted because of having crossloadings on a 
second factor, resulting in a final scale of 11 items. The reliability of the items for the total scale 
was .87, and all loadings were high (see Table 1).  
3) Protective actions. We adopted the 10 items from Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) comprising both 
voluntary and involuntary protective actions. Responses were obtained on seven-point Likert-
scales. The exploratory factor analysis suggests that the items form a single factor (KMO = .87; 
eigenvalue = 4.43; explained variance = 49 percent). One item that loaded on a separate factor 
was excluded from the analysis, resulting in a final scale consisting of 9 items. The reliability of 
this scale was .87, and all loadings were high (see Table 1). 
Coping tactics. The development of the scales for measuring salespeople’s tactics for 
coping with SCA was mainly based on the work of Gross (1999), Rachman (1998), Wells (2000; 
Wells and Mathews 1994), and Foa and Kozak (1986) by adapting their therapy models for 
emotion regulation to the sales context. Situation modification refers to attempts to actively change 
a situation that induces SCA. Item creation drew upon Foa and Kozak (1986) as well as Folkman et 
al. (1986) and resulted in 4 items referring to confrontational/approaching behaviors of the 
salesperson (e.g., “In difficult moments (for instance in closing) I do not give in but try to find a 
way to influence the customer.”). Attentional deployment refers to distraction from problems and 
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focusing on the task instead and is the most frequently employed type of measurement found in 
psychological research on anxiety (e.g., Rachman 1998; Wells and Matthews 1994; Wells 2000). 
Drawing upon this literature, we measured attentional deployment by 5 items (e.g., “I do not allow 
myself to get distracted by laughter or improper behavior of the customer.”). 
An exploratory factor analysis indicates that the coping items form two factors as expected 
(KMO = .79, eigenvalues = 3.66 and 1.35, respectively, explaining 72 percent of the variance). 
After exclusion of two items with unsatisfactorily high crossloadings we achieved final scales for 
situation modification consisting of 4 items (range of factor loadings = .69 to .91) and for 
attentional deployment consisting of 3 items (range of factor loadings = .81 to .94). Cronbach 
alphas for the two scales were .82 and .85, respectively. 
Analytical procedures 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test for the convergent and discriminant 
validity of measures of variables. Because 39 items were used as measures (see Table 1), we 
combined items into parcels of three indicators each for anxiety cognitions, physiological 
sensations, and protective actions, and we used the individual items for situational modification and 
attentional deployment as indicators, so as to achieve a ratio of sample size to the number of 
parameter estimates of nearly 5:1. This meant that we used a type of “partial disaggregation” model 
for our test of the CFA, as recommended by Bagozzi and Edwards (1998). 
To test the relationships between coping strategies, SCA components, and protective 
actions, we used a set of linear regression analyses. Interaction effects between coping strategies 
and SCA components were included in the analysis by adding the multiplicative products of the 
scores of the interacting variables as interaction terms (Aiken and West 1991; see also House 
1981). We used LISREL to perform regressions (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1996, ch. 4 and p. 196). 
Measurement error was taken into account as recommended by Jöreskog and Sörbom (1996; see 
also Hayduk 1987) and done by Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000). The regression of coping strategies 
and anxiety components (i.e., anxiety cognitions and physiological sensations) on protective actions 
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was computed as a hierarchical analysis, testing only main effects in a first step and adding the 
interactions between coping and anxiety components to the analysis in a second step to check for 
improvements in explained variance. All variables were mean centered. 
Results 
The five-factor CFA model for the measures of the variables fit satisfactorily:  χ2(94) = 
198.80, p = .00, RMSEA = .086, NNFI = .92, CFI = .94, and SRMR = .069. Factor loadings were 
relatively high:  situational modification (.63 - .83), attentional deployment (.69 - .81), anxiety 
cognitions (.84 - .94), physiological sensations (.66 - .93), and protective actions (.81 - .89). Table 2 
shows the intercorrelations among factors, where it can be seen that the factors are correlated at low 
to moderately high levels (range:  -.61 to .60), and the confidence intervals suggest that 
discriminant validity has been achieved. 
The findings for the regression analysis are summarized in Table 3. We discuss the main 
and interaction effects hereafter.   
(Place Table 3 about here) 
Regarding protective actions, the two coping strategies and the two SCA components 
explained 28 percent of the variance as main effects. By adding the interaction effects of coping 
strategies with SCA components to the analysis, an additional 20 percent in variance of protective 
actions was explained, thus significantly improving the explained variance over the main-effects 
model. Specifically, both SCA components (i.e., anxiety cognitions and physiological sensations) 
affect protective actions. In accordance with Verbeke and Bagozzi’s (2000) findings, salespeople 
showed more protective actions when SCA increased, as reflected in the two components. Situation 
modification had a negative direct impact on protective actions. Salespeople therefore reduced their 
protective actions effectively by applying active problem-solving approaches. Attentional 
deployment strategies failed to produce a significant main effect on protective actions. As a result, 
Hypothesis 1 and 4 are supported. 
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The results of the interaction effects regarding protective actions show an interesting 
pattern. Situation modification was found to have a positive effect in interaction with anxiety 
cognitions, whereas in interaction with physiological sensations, the direction of the effect changes, 
thus resulting in a negative effect on protective actions. The opposite was found for the interaction 
effects between attentional deployment and the SCA components. That is, whereas attentional 
deployment has a negative effect in interaction with anxiety cognitions on protective actions, it has 
a positive effect in interaction with physiological sensations, as predicted. As a consequence, the 
effectiveness of the two coping strategies is tied to specific SCA patterns in terms of SCA 
component intensities. 
As House (1981) recommends, the full interpretation of regression findings should be 
plotted for different levels of the interacting variables. To plot the interaction effects, we therefore 
partitioned the sample into individuals with high versus low anxiety cognitions and high versus low 
physiological sensations, with scores one standard deviation above and one standard deviation 
below the mean (see Jaccard and Turisi 2003). The corresponding regression lines are shown in 
Figures 2 to 5. 
(Place Figures 2 to 5 about here) 
As can be seen in Figure 2, attentional deployment reduces protective actions when anxiety 
cognitions are present. The impact of attentional deployment on protective actions is greater for 
high versus low anxiety cognitions. That is, attentional deployment proves to be a more efficient 
coping strategy when anxiety cognitions are high as compared to when anxiety cognitions are low. 
Hypothesis 2 is therefore supported. Figure 3 shows the opposite effect of attentional deployment 
in the presence of physiological sensations. The use of attentional deployment strategies is counter-
indicated when physiological sensations are present. The salesperson’s urge to use protective 
actions gets stronger with increasing use of attentional deployment strategies. The extent of this 
increase is significantly greater when felt physiological sensations are high versus low. Hypothesis 
3 is thus supported.  
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Reversed patterns of findings occur for situation modification as a strategy for coping with 
SCA. The effectiveness of situation modification strategies increases to the extent that 
physiological sensations increase (Figure 4) and decreases to the extent that anxiety cognitions 
grow (Figure 5). Situation modification lowers protective actions in the presence of physiological 
sensations. This effect was found to be stronger in the high physiological sensations condition 
compared to low physiological sensations condition (Figure 4). Hypothesis 6 is therefore supported. 
Using situation modification when anxiety cognitions are high leads to an increase in protective 
actions, whereas the same coping strategy has no effect on protective actions, when anxiety 
cognitions are low (Figure 5). This finding supports Hypothesis 5. 
Discussion 
SCA is an intrusive, persistent fear about dealing with customers and results in the 
undertaking of protective actions which have negative impacts on performance (Verbeke and 
Bagozzi 2000). We presented a revised SCA model (cf. Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000) consisting of 
cognitive and physiological components, both of which affect the individual’s protective actions. 
Then we developed hypotheses concerning how salespeople cope with SCA. Two coping tactics 
were studied:  situation modification and attentional deployment. Coping was then found to interact 
differentially with the two components of SCA to influence protective actions. The results indicate 
that situation modification is well suited for reducing protective actions, and attentional deployment 
is an effective means for lowering protective actions, but under specific circumstances (that is, in 
interaction with specific SCA components; see comments below). In other words, our study shows 
that salespeople who are capable of using the appropriate coping strategies can manage their SCA 
effectively. 
Significantly, we found interaction effects between anxiety components and coping 
strategies for reducing protective actions: situation modification seems to decrease protective 
actions best under conditions of intensely felt physiological sensations (versus less intensely felt 
sensations), whereas attentional deployment seems to be the best strategy for handling protective 
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actions when anxiety cognitions are high (versus low). In other words, our findings indicate that the 
effect of one and the same coping strategy might yield positive or negative effects, with a change in 
intensity of the particular SCA components. What is an effective strategy for reducing protective 
actions under conditions of high anxiety cognitions proved to worsen protective actions under 
conditions of high physiological sensations. In this regard, a salesperson’s coping efforts are 
embedded in specific SCA environments that can facilitate or hinder their functioning. Attentional 
deployment as a coping technique is an effective means to regulate a person’s cognitions, which 
makes it highly efficient for reducing protective actions with a strong cognitive basis (i.e., in 
interaction with intense anxiety cognitions). The experience of being able to reduce the negative 
(anxiety) cognitions relieves the urge to escape the anxiety-inducing situation. In the presence of 
intense physiological sensations, however, attentional deployment will even increase protective 
actions, as the salesperson realizes that s/he is not able to control his/her anxiety physiology and 
thus has to engage in protective actions to avoid the SCA situation. Situation modification attempts, 
on the other hand, focus on regulating physiological sensations. As a consequence, when 
physiological sensations are high, the experience of reducing the anxiety physiology has a 
plummeting effect on protective actions. Strong anxiety cognitions though -- through occupying the 
salesperson’s attentional and cognitive resources -- inhibit successful situation modification, with 
such an experience, in turn, fostering anxiety and associated urges to withdraw.      
We now present implications of these findings for existing perspectives on how salespeople 
can develop coping tactics in order to deal with their SCA. We especially focus on the issue that 
both coping strategies can be productive or counter productive, depending on the nature and 
intensities of the SCA components.  
Given that the two coping strategies prove to be fruitful in reducing anxiety and related 
protective actions, one could argue that salespeople should learn to use both strategies, which might 
be called the “maxi approach”. Such a proposition is popular with practitioners (e.g., Bourne 2000) 
as well as academics (e.g., Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000). The philosophy behind this idea might be 
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that, depending on the situation, people could choose from a range of coping techniques. 
Psychologists (e.g., Saarni 1997; Gross 1999) have noted that the effectiveness of a particular 
coping behavior is highly dependent on the criteria adopted and the situation at hand. It therefore 
may be adaptive and effective to have a range of different coping strategies available from which 
one can flexibly choose (e.g., Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Saarni 1997). Saarni (1999, p. 226) 
supports this policy: “optimal self- and emotion-regulation development appears to entail the 
acquisition of a flexible repertoire of coping strategies”. As a consequence, salespeople might be 
trained to apply a wide range of coping strategies. In such training, salespeople should be instructed 
in different skills (encompassing particular problem-solving approaches and distraction techniques) 
that enable them to cope effectively with negative emotional events. As a consequence, salespeople 
who have successfully learned different coping strategies should be able to effectively regulate 
their SCA, regardless of whether cognitions and physiological sensations are high or low. But as 
this study also shows, applying this philosophy might not always be wise. Attentional deployment, 
for instance, will be a counterproductive coping strategy when physiological sensations become 
more intense. Judging situations correctly and flexibly switching between different coping 
strategies within different situations might require considerable cognitive resources from 
salespeople as well as extensive training and practice.     
A second coping philosophy (a “mini approach”) is based upon different reasoning. 
Intraindividual differences might play an important role in coping with SCA, since “the simple 
question of what works best” should be replaced by “the more important question of what works 
best for whom” (Zinbarg et al. 1992, p. 262). Psychological research indicates that components of 
SCA might have a dispositional side (e.g., Wells 1994; Main 1983); that is, different types of SCA 
(in terms of combinations of high/low anxiety cognitions and physiological sensations) might be 
due to stable individual differences. First, anxiety cognitions refer to a focus on one’s negative 
beliefs (e.g., being rejected by the customer) that might be captured by the notion of self-
consciousness as a trait (e.g., Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 1975), specifically public self-
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consciousness which relates to a person’s dispositional concern with his/her social appearance and 
the impressions made on others. Similarly, Wells (1994; Wells and Papageorgiou 1998) shows that 
worrying has a dispositional side to it. For felt physiological symptoms, psychologists have also 
identified trait characteristics. Shields and Stern (1979) and Main (1983) discovered a disposition 
for focusing on somatic perceptions. Particularly in the context of social anxiety, some researchers 
have identified a group of people termed, “physiological reactors”, who are especially characterized 
by high arousal during social interactions and respond better to physiology based treatments (Oest, 
Jerremalm, and Johansson 1981; Jerremalm, Jansson, and Oest 1986). These findings imply that the 
type of SCA a salesperson experiences (as a particular combination of high/low anxiety cognitions 
and physiological sensations) might be relatively constant across time and situations. If indeed 
people do have systematic SCA responses (wherein one component dominates the other), teaching 
people a plethora of coping techniques might be an ineffective strategy, because a lot of coping 
strategies might turn out to be counterproductive when the person’s SCA reaches a certain intensity 
level. Therefore, these people should focus instead on the coping strategy that is most efficient for 
their specific type of SCA: situation modification in the case of high physiological sensations and 
attentional deployment in the case of high anxiety cognitions. 
Our study shows that salespeople should apply one coping strategy above another when 
their SCA tends to be characterized by strong cognitions versus physiological sensations. Recall 
that the two coping techniques, which salespeople used in this study, were largely automatic and 
not intentional. This seems to imply that these techniques, if used in a more intentional way, would 
be functional. Yet, selecting and applying the proper tactics for coping with SCA in real-life 
situations may be a difficult task to achieve by oneself. As Rosenbaum (e.g., 1983) argues, it is 
difficult for people to apply therapeutic methods on their own. Indeed, managing one’s emotions 
might not be easy, because emotional experiences (and thus SCA) occur via implicit pathways in 
the central and autonomic nervous system. Salespeople might therefore have difficulties in 
identifying or making their SCA explicit, let alone managing it (e.g., Stanton and Franz 1999). 
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Sales managers should therefore coach their salespeople and assist them in the diagnosis of, and the 
coping with, SCA. First, sales managers should be taught how to detect signs of SCA in their 
salespeople. The presence of SCA might be indicated by a salesperson’s inability to successfully 
close sales interactions, even when they know their product well and have good communication 
skills. These and other behavioral patterns might signal SCA issues. Second, once SCA is detected, 
managers have to help their salespeople explore more deeply the type of SCA they are suffering 
from, with a goal of trying to uncover whether they are stuck with negative beliefs and worries or 
whether they focus too intensely on their physiological sensations and presentational styles. Finally, 
sales managers should help their salespeople in the training and use of coping strategies. As 
Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000, p. 97) point out, sales managers “should take a coaching attitude when 
salespeople are prone to develop SCA”. Verbeke and Bagozzi (2000) did not consider the specific 
coping alternatives we studied herein, but these can be used effectively in training and on-going 
management practices to help salespeople overcome SCA.   
Further Research 
An interesting question that arises from our findings is whether different types of SCA are 
enduring or whether they vary across time and situations. Because we did not investigate 
systematic relationships between personality variables, this topic will require future research. If 
SCA can be linked to such trait variables as locus of control (Rotter 1966), self-consciousness (e.g., 
Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss 1975), or autonomic nervous system reactivity (Klein and Cacioppo 
1993), then it might be expected to be rather stable, for example.  
Second, we focused on the effectiveness of particular coping strategies on SCA components 
and protective actions. Yet, it might be interesting to investigate SCA and coping behavior of 
higher performing, as opposed to less successful, salespeople. And if it is the case that better 
performing salespeople use more coping tactics and use a maxi coping philosophy, say, this might 
speak in favor of teaching a wider range of different strategies to salespeople, rather than focusing 
on one particular technique. There is an additional argument speaking for a maxi approach of 
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coping: by limiting one’s repertoire of coping strategies, salespeople might become less versatile, 
thus reducing their general coping resources in novel situations (e.g., Bonanno 2001). But, are 
salespeople really capable of efficiently choosing between multiple coping techniques while 
experiencing SCA? This issue is in need of future research. 
Third, it would be informative to investigate how exactly salespeople develop their coping 
strategies. Do salespeople come to the job with or without needed coping tactics in their repertoire? 
To what extent are salespeople able to learn from past failures in sales situations, and to what extent 
across various sales contexts is SCA present and what coping responses should be used to address 
it? Research here might provide answers to the question whether, as some authors argue (e.g., 
Meichenbaum 1977; 1985), coping strategies can be learned in training on the job or whether such 
resourcefulness is more a trait that is acquired early in life and therefore management needs to take 
this into account when selecting new salespeople. A number of interesting individual difference and 
situational issues remain to be studied in salesforce research.  
Finally, although research has shown that SCA is negatively related to a salesperson’s 
communication performance and sales volume performance (Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000; Verbeke 
and Bagozzi 2003), there is reason to believe that SCA also reduces job satisfaction and increases 
turnover rates as well as absenteeism of salespeople. Verbeke and Bagozzi (2003) for instance, 
found that SCA leads to attempts to avoid future contact with customers. For the case of strong 
SCA, this might cause salespeople to disengage from their jobs in order to avoid customer contacts, 
negatively impact performance, and eventually lead to turnover. Moreover, repeated feelings of 
SCA can be viewed as considerable job stressors, and the link between stress and job 
dissatisfaction, absenteeism, as well as turnover is well-established (e.g., Porter and Steers 1973; 





1. Referring to similar phenomena, some authors call such behaviors protective actions or safety seeking behaviors 
(e.g., Verbeke and Bagozzi 2000), others avoidance behaviors (e.g., Rachman 1998) or withdrawal (e.g., Leary and 
Kowalski 1995).  
 
2. Disorders of fear regulation are at the core of many pathological conditions. For instance, anxiety, panic, or phobic 
disorders are common symptoms of fear regulation (e.g., LeDoux 1995). We therefore refer to research from fear 
studies as well as from anxiety studies for describing the boundary conditions of SCA. 
 
3. LeDoux (e.g., 1995; 1998) conceives of anxiety as a product of learning (Pavlovian conditioning), similar to 
exposure therapists (e.g., Wolpe 1958; Foa and Kozak 1986). 
 
4. These two strategies also capture the general distinction between problem- and emotion-focused coping (e.g., 
Lazarus and Folkman 1984; Endler and Parker 1990), and correspond to such distinctions as active versus passive 
coping (e.g., Bongard 1995), or primary versus secondary control (e.g., Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder 1982). 
 
5. Similarly to SCA, test anxiety is characterized by a preoccupation with self-denigrating and seemingly catastrophic 
thoughts (Sarason and Sarason 1990; Wine 1971). 
 
6. In support of this conclusion, Suls and Fletcher (1985) show that attention to somatic symptoms is preferable to 
distraction, when the focus of the attention is on concrete characteristics of the physical sensations rather than on 
diffuse physical states or cognitive responses. This process of observing physical sensations is called “sensory 
monitoring” (e.g., Leventhal et al. 1979; Leventhal and Mosbach 1983) and is presumed to come with relatively neutral 
perceptions of the sensations. Research on chronic pain and pain in childbirth support this view (e.g., Leventhal et al. 
1989; Kabat-Zinn 1982; 1984). 
 
7. Worrying can be used as a synonym for anxiety cognitions in the context of social anxiety. Researchers use both 
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Appendix 1:  Questionnaire Items 
 
Situation modification 
(sm1) “In difficult moments (for instance in closing) I do not give in but try to find a way to 
influence the customer.” 
(sm2) “If customers use negative language or speak up against me, I am not afraid of asking 
them for their reasons.” 
(sm3) “If the customer is about to refuse my offer, I ask why, counter his arguments, and make 
a new proposition.” 
(sm4) “If I realize that in a sales situation the customer starts to react less positively to my offer, 
I try to find the reason why and convince the customer afterwards.” 
 
Attentional deployment 
(ad1) “If others show negative body language in the sales situation, I do not let this affect me.” 
(ad2) “I do not allow myself to get distracted by laughter or inadequate behavior of the 
customer.” 
(ad3) “I do not get confused by an inadequate or irrelevant remark of the customer.” 
 
Anxiety cognitions 
(cog1) “I hope I can listen carefully to what the customer says.” 
(cog2)  “I hope I will not start stuttering.” 
(cog3) “I hope I will not fumble for words.” 
(cog4) “I hope I will be alert.” 
(cog5) “I hope I will not give in to the customer.” 
(cog6) “I hope I will not waffle my words.” 
(cog7) “The customer thinks that I do not have authority.” 
(cog8) “The customer thinks that I am not professional.” 
(cog9) “The customer thinks that I am an insecure person.” 
(cog10) “The customer thinks that I am not reliable.” 
(cog11) “The customer thinks salespersons from other suppliers are better salespeople than I.” 
(cog12) “I think that the customer will laugh at me afterward.” 
 
Physiological sensations 
(phy1) “My thoughts are wandering off.” 
 
(phy2) “I suddenly start to stutter.” 
(phy3) “I look away from the customer.” 
(phy4) “I set out to talk louder now.” 
(phy5) “I become panicky.” 
(phy6) “I am already getting tired now.” 
(phy7) “I cannot observe a silence.” 
(phy8) “I dare not look the customer in the eyes.” 
(phy9) “My hands are trembling.” 
(phy10) “I am going to say too much.” 




(saf1) “In difficult moments I quickly change the subject.” 
(saf2) “In difficult moments I adopt a passive attitude.” 
(saf3) “In difficult moments I think “I should not ask this… I find this topic irrelevant…” 
(saf4) “In difficult moments I offer the customer too many extras.” 
(saf5) “In difficult moments I say, “You do not have to decide now; you may think it over.” 
(saf6) “In difficult moments I say to the customer, “You need not answer all questions.” 
(saf7) “In difficult situations I often apologize quickly to the customer.” 
(saf8) “In difficult situations I talk less persuasively to the customer.” 
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Table 2. Factor Intercorrelations and Standard Errors 
 
Situational modification     1.00     
Attentional deployment .44 (0.7)     1.00    
Anxiety cognitions -.40 (.07) -.36 (.07)     1.00   
Physiological sensations -.39 (.08) -.26 (.08) .60 (.06)     1.00  
Protective actions -.61 (.06) -.43 (.07) .52 (.06) .56 (.06) 1.00 
 
 




 Dependent variables 










































R2 .28 .48 
* = p < .05; ** = p < .01 
 
Figure 1. Sales Call Anxiety as a Syndrome of Two
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Figure 3: Interaction effects between attentional deployment and physiological sensations 






























Figure 4: Interaction effects between situation modification and physiological sensations 
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